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BY ROBERT F. SCHOPP, PH.D.,
AND MICHAEL R. QUATTROCCHI, PH.D.
Although the legal doctrine of special relationships was a
cornerstone of the Tarasoff decision, the authors argue that the
conceptual relationship among that doctrine, the documented
inability to predict violence, and the duty to warn is such as to
preclude the foundation of a duty to warn on the doctrine of
special relationships.
The California Supreme Court, in its controversial Thrasoff
decision, ruled that a psychotherapist may be found negli-
gent when he fails to prevent his patient from harming
someone.
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his
profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious
danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use
reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger.
The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take one or
AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors are indebted to Haig Katchadourian for
his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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more of various steps, depending on the nature of the case. Thus it
may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to
apprise the victim of danger, to notify the police, or to take
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circum-
stances.'
The court based this decision on the doctrine of special
relationships, which provides a basis for the duty to control
the behavior of third parties, and on the policy considera-
tions involved in protecting the public from dangerous
assault. The reasoning presented by the court in Tarasoff
has been accepted by courts in Pennsylvania, Nebraska, and
New Jersey.2
The Tarasoff decision evoked considerable controversy and
numerous commentaries, many of which discussed the ade-
quacy of professional standards for the prediction of
dangerousness or the policy considerations involved in the
decision.3 The most commonly identified policy issue con-
cerned the debate over whether warning the potential victim
would increase or decrease the probability of harm. 4 The
competing public interest in promoting effective psy-
chotherapy (particularly for potentially dangerous patients)
and the role of confidentiality in this interest also received
significant attention.'
There remains a rather puzzling aspect of the court's deci-
sion which has not been resolved in the Tarasoff literature.
The court defined a duty for a therapist who determines or
should determine that his patient presents a serious danger
of violence when it had already cited a strong body of
evidence demonstrating that therapists cannot determine
this; i.e., the court simultaneously declared that therapists
must act upon a judgment and acknowledged that this
judgment lies beyond the capacity of the profession.6 It is
important to note that the court did not refute or even
question this evidence. Rather, the court cited the doctrine
of special relationships as the source of a duty to control
third parties, argued that the psychotherapist's diagnosis
and prediction of danger are comparable to judgments that
doctors and other professionals must regularly make, and
concluded that therapists must predict and warn to the
standards of the profession.'
Hence, the doctrine of special relationships is the corner-
stone of the court's argument in favor of a duty to warn.
While the court definitely asserts that the psychotherapeutic
relationship is such a special relationship, it does not indi-
cate exactly what makes a relationship special in this sense
or what it is about psychotherapy that renders it such a
relationship.
This article will concentrate on this specific aspect of the
Tarasoff decision. We will advance an analysis of the doc-
trine of special relationships as contained in the sources cited
by the Tarasoff court in order to determine whether the
psychotherapeutic relationship falls within the scope of this
doctrine and, if so, what duties follow. We will argue that
the conceptual relationship among the doctrine of special
relationships, the duty to warn, and the inability to predict is
such that when clearly explicated and interpreted in light of
the psychotherapist's inability to predict, this doctrine can-
not be appropriately applied and, hence, it cannot provide a
foundation for a duty to warn or for any other duty which
presupposes a capacity to predict.
II.
The facts of the Tarasoff case have been widely reported and
discussed; consequently, only a brief summary will be in-
cluded here. Prosenjit Poddar allegedly informed a psychol-
ogist employed by the University of California that he
intended to kill Tatiana Tarasoff when she returned from a
summer vacation. Poddar was a voluntary outpatient in-
volved in psychotherapy with the psychologist. While Tara-
soff was not identified by name, it was alleged that she was
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easily identifiable by description. The psychologist, in con-
sultation with others in his deparment, decided that Poddar
should be committed to a mental hospital for observation.
The psychologist communicated this decision to the campus
police, who in turn detained Poddar briefly, and then re-
leased him when, in their judgment, he appeared to be
rational. The director of the Department of Psychiatry at
the university hospital then ordered that no further attempt
be made to have Poddar detained. Poddar killed Tarasoff
when she returned approximately two months later, and her
parents sued the psychologist and his colleagues who had
been involved in the case for negligent failure to warn the
victim, or others likely to warn her, of the danger. The
California Supreme Court decided in favor of the family on
this issue and, in doing so, established the duty described at
the beginning of this article.8
The court reasoned that the defendant-therapists were negli-
gent in failing to fulfill an obligation incurred in the psy-
chotherapeutic relationship. Negligence in the practice of a
profession involves the failure to carry out an obligation to a
standard of competence and care that is required of those
who are recognized as qualified in that profession and a
causal connection between this failure and harm suffered by
another.9
In order for there to be negligence, there first must be a
duty. Under the common law, one person generally has no
obligation to control the conduct of a third person."0 How-
ever, the doctrine of special relationships provides an excep-
tion to this general rule in those situations in which:
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
gives to the other a right to protection."
The Tarasoff court employed this doctrine as the source of a
therapist's duty to prevent his patient from harming another.
The court cited several precedent cases in which physicians
and other professionals had been held liable for failing to
take reasonable care to control others and concluded that
these precedents were correctly applied to the instant case
and hence that psychotherapists have a duty to prevent their
patients from causing harm to others. 2 Several of the cases
cited involved physicians who had been found negligent for
failure to warn others of the dangers emanating from the
illnesses of their patients and the court concluded that
psychotherapists also have an obligation to prevent harm
through warnings issued to potential victims.
In citing the doctrine of special relationships as the source of
the duty to prevent harm, the court relied heavily on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and a seminal article by
Harper and Kime.' 3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides an analysis of four different types of relationships
which are identified as Type A relationships and which are
analogous to four subsets of cases identified by Harper and
Kime. These involve the following: parent and child, master
and servant, possessor of land or chattels and licensee, and,
finally, those in charge of dangerous persons. The duty does
not rise purely from the existence of these relationships;
rather, certain conditions must be met in any specific case.
In each case, the actor who is participating in one of these
relationships has a duty to control the third person only if
(1) the actor knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control the third party, and (2) the actor knows or
should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising
such control. 4 However, the principle which describes Type
A cases and which was quoted above from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts only states that there is a duty to control
third persons in those relationships which impose such a
duty. It provides no general rules by which to identify such
relationships.
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Harper and Kime report a series of cases in which the actor
was held liable for failure to control a third party, and they
argue that these cases were bound together by the nature of
the relationships between the actors and the third parties.
They conclude that an actor has a duty to control the
behavior of a third party in order to prevent danger to
another if the actor is in some special relationship with the
third person, ". . which gives him a peculiar ability to
affect that person's conduct." 5
This review of the doctrine of special relationships, as
presented by Harper and Kime and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, reveals that a principle can be abstracted
which integrates these two sources and identifies the ele-
ments a case must include in order to fall within the scope of
this doctrine. We would like to advance the following for-
mulation of that principle.
[1] An individual (A) has a duty to conduct his relationship with
a third person (B) in such a manner as to take reasonable care
to control the conduct of B in order to prevent B from
causing harm to another (C) just in case A stands in a special
relationship to B such that: (1) the nature of that relationship
provides A with some peculiar ability to control the conduct
of B, (2) A knows or should know that he has the ability to
control B; and (3) A knows or should know of the necessity
and opportunity for controlling B.
Having identified the doctrine of special relationships as the
source of a duty to control the conduct of third persons, the
Tarasoff court then offered a series of precedent cases in
order to establish that doctor-patient and, thus, thera-
pist-patient relationships fall under the scope of this doc-
trine. We will review these cases in order to determine
whether they are consistent with the doctrine of special
relationships as represented by [1] (and, thus, by the
authorities cited by the Tarasoff court).
III.
The cases cited by the court described a variety of relation-
ships which can be roughly divided into those in which the
actor had custody of the third person and those in which
there was no custody. Some custodial cases were primarily
concerned with decisions to discharge patients from inpa-
tient care following inadequate consideration of their
dangerous propensities or with refusal to hospitalize a pro-
spective patient who had been identified as homicidal.' 6
Other cases involved hospitals that failed to take reasonable
care to prevent patients from self-injury through suicide or
escape attempts.'" In other custodial cases, physicians and
others were declared negligent for their failure to communi-
cate their knowledge of the dangerous propensities of pa-
tients when they transferred these patients to the custody or
care of another. 8 The court also cited cases in which
nonmedical institutions had been held liable for releasing
dangerous inmates without warning potential victims who
were readily identifiable. 9 Finally, the court cited two cases
in which the guardians of dangerous minors failed to take
reasonable care to prevent these minors from harming
others.20
All of these cases involved situations in which the actor had
custody or the opportunity and responsibility to assume
custody of the dangerous third person by virtue of the
actor's role in a professional (or parental) relationship with
the third person. In all cases, the actor had access to
information regarding recent dangerous behavior which
would have led a reasonable person to be aware of the
danger and of his opportunity to control the dangerous
person by carefully executing custodial responsibilities.
Hence, all of these cases fall within the scope of [1] by the
nature of the relationship between the actor and the third
party.
The Tarasoff case involved an outpatient and the court cited
other cases in order to establish its contention that similar
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duties applied to patients who are not in custody. Two cases
involved some overt action by a physician which contributed
to the danger. In one of these, a drug was prescribed without
the appropriate warnings regarding side effects, while in the
other a physician inaccurately advised the patient that he
could safely drive. 2' Several noncustodial cases were inci-
dents in which physicians had failed to diagnose a conta-
gious disease or, having diagnosed it, failed to issue the
appropriate warnings to potential victims or authorities. 2 In
all of these cases, the diagnosis, in the court's opinion,
should have been made through the exercise of reasonable
care and ordinary competence. The physicians in these cases
did not have physical control of the patients but they did
possess, by virtue of their professional training, the knowl-
edge which provided them with a peculiar ability to perceive
the danger to others and to eliminate or reduce this danger
by communicating this information to potential victims or
appropriate authorities.
Although these noncustodial cases were presented by the
Tarasoff court as ones in which the doctrine of special
relationships applied, they are not easily reconciled with this
doctrine as represented by [1]. In order to accommodate
these cases, the conception of "a peculiar ability to control"
would have to include not only those situations in which the
actor has an ability to control the conduct of the third party,
but also those in which the actor possesses some capacity to
influence potential harm caused by the third party through
the application and communication of special knowledge.
Hence, a doctrine of special relationships that can accom-
modate both [1] (which has been distilled from Harper and
Kime and the Restatement (Second) of Torts) and the full
array of precedent cases cited by the Tarasoff court would
have to apply to relationships in which the actor has either
some peculiar ability to control the conduct of the third
party or some peculiar ability to influence potential harm
done by the third party through means other than control-
ling his conduct.
In light of the above analysis, we would like to advance the
following derivative of [1] as a proposed working formula-
tion of the principle which underlies the doctrine of special
relationships as it has been formulated by Harper and Kime
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts and as it has actually
been applied to professional relationships by the courts
which ruled on the precedent cases cited by the Tarasoff
court.
[2] A professional (P) has a duty to conduct his professional
relationship with a third person (B) in such a manner as to
exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to others potentially
caused by B just in case the nature of this relationship is such
that: (1) the practice of P's profession provides him with
some special ability to decrease the probability of harm
potentially caused by B; (2) P knows or should know that he
has this ability; and (3) P knows or should know of the
necessity and opportunity for influencing the harm threat-
ened by B.'
In summary, we have attempted to derive a principle which
captures the essential elements of the doctrine of special
relationships as applied to Type A special relationships by
the various sources cited by the Tarasoff court. Harper and
Kime stated that the central issue addressed by the doctrine
of special relationships is one of negligence.24 As stated
previously, negligence in the practice of a profession involves
the failure to carry out an obligation to a standard of
competence and care required of those practicing that pro-
fession. Should P's profession provide a special capacity to
influence harm, then he violates the ordinary competence
provision if he lacks this capacity; if he possesses it but falls
to exercise it, then he falls short of the reasonable care
requirement. Therefore, [2] conceptualizes the doctrine of
special relationships as an extension of the general principle
of negligence. In the next section, we will apply [2] to the
practice of psychotherapy in order to determine whether
psychotherapy falls within the scope of the doctrine of
special relationships and, if so, whether the duty prescribed
by the Tarasoff court is appropriate.
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IV.
Attempts to develop a generally inclusive definition of psy-
chotherapy have met with considerable controversy. How-
ever, the following has been suggested as a "generic"
definition. "Psychotherapy is (1) a relation among persons,
engaged in by (2) one or more individuals defined as needing
special assistance to (3) improve their functioning as per-
sons, together with (4) one or more individuals defined as
able to render such special help. 12 5 The therapist is generally
expected to be a trained professional who has developed a
command of a body of knowledge and proficiency in a series
of techniques which are applied within the context of a
professional relationship. While proponents of various theo-
retical orientations may differ regarding specific details,
most would agree that successful therapy depends on both
expertise and relationship.2
6
The first requirement of [2] is that the substance of the
profession in question must provide some peculiar capacity
to influence the harm done by others. What if any such
capacity is provided by the substance of psychotherapy? The
Tarasoff decision called for action including warnings to
prevent harm when the therapist knew or should have
known of danger. Clearly, warning does not constitute a
special ability; it is a technique which presupposes certain
capacities. The court's argument in favor of a duty to warn
for psychotherapists relied heavily on the duty to warn,
which is well established for physicians dealing with dangers
emanating from physical diseases. The duty to warn in these
cases arises from the physician's special knowledge of physi-
cal diseases, which allows him to foresee harm when the
ordinary man would not, and hence provides him with a
special capacity to prevent harm through the communication
of this knowledge. In a like manner, the court held that
therapists should be expected to communicate special knowl-
edge of dangerousness which they have or should have by
virtue of their professional role.
The court stated that warnings should not be issued in
response to every threat; rather, the therapist is to differenti-
ate innocuous threats from those which pose a real danger.
"Certainly a therapist should not be encouraged routinely to
reveal such threats . . . . To the contrary, the therapist's
obligation to his patient requires that he not disclose a
confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert
danger to others .... "-2
Such a duty clearly presupposes an ability to predict danger-
ous behavior with a considerable degree of accuracy. The
court recognized the fact that therapists are not able to
predict dangerousness with scientific certainty, and required
only that they predict with the degree of skill, knowledge,
and care demanded by the standards of the profession.
Unfortunately, a rather large and consistent body of empiri-
cal evidence indicates that the standards of the profession
include no ability to accurately predict dangerous behavior.
Not only have psychologists and psychiatrists been unable to
predict dangerousness to a degree of accuracy which would
justify infringing on a client's rights, they have been unable
to predict any more accurately than have nonprofessionals."
Strictly speaking, this research regarding the therapist's
ability to predict dangerousness is not directly applicable to
the 7arasoff situation. Most prediction studies have involved
the accuracy of predictions of dangerousness related to
admission/discharge decisions with patients who had been
previously committed, evaluated for commitment, or in
some way identified as dangerous (frequently by past
dangerous acts). Consequently, the reasonable conclusion
appears to be that we have no data directly regarding the
ability of therapists to predict dangerousness in Tarasoff-like
situations, and the most nearly applicable data which are
available consistently support the contention that the sub-
stance of the profession provides no ability to predict and
therefore no special ability to influence potential harm
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through warnings or other actions predicated upon predic-
tions. 29 Hence, the application of [2] to the psychothera-
peutic relationship demonstrates that psychotherapy lacks
one of the fundamental elements required by the doctrine of
special relationships to justify a duty to influence potential
harm through warning.
This analysis rejects the court's decision requiring therapists
to prevent harm by foreseeing danger and issuing warnings
because the special capacity presupposed by this technique
does not exist. However, it does not follow from this
analysis that psychotherapy is not a Type A special relation-
ship by virtue of some other capacity. It only follows that
this specific duty is not accurately founded. We will briefly
review the function and effectiveness of psychotherapy in
order to determine whether there is some other special
capacity which might appropriately place psychotherapy
within the scope of [2] and hence give rise to some duty to
prevent harm.
Wolman describes psychotherapy as: "... a more or less
systematic attempt to help a patient achieve maturity, auton-
omy, responsibility, and skill in adult living."3 While the
issues involved in psychotherapy outcome research are com-
plex and controversial, there is a growing body of research
in support of the hypothesis that those who receive psy-
chotherapy exhibit more measurable improvement than
those in no treatment or placebo control groups.'
Unfortunately, outcome studies vary widely in the nature of
their dependent variables and methods of measurement.
Most of the currently available research provides only
general information regarding the effectiveness of a variety
of therapeutic approaches with many different types of
clients and target problems. Consequently, this research does
not indicate the degree to which psychotherapy may be an
effective means of preventing any particular type of danger-
ous behavior by any identifiable subset of clients.32 However,
there is some evidence to support the efficacy of certain
therapeutic approaches to anger control.33 Due to the general
nature of the available data regarding therapeutic effective-
ness, any claim that psychotherapy can serve the specific
purpose of preventing dangerous behavior must remain
tentative. However, to the degree that psychotherapy can
have a positive effect on the client's tendency to function
within the broad constraints of societal limits on dangerous
behavior, the competent and responsible practitioner of
psychotherapy possesses a peculiar capacity to influence the
potentially harmful behavior of his client. This capacity is a
function of his expertise in the field of psychotherapy; the
therapist exercises this capacity through the competent and
responsible pursuit of the therapeutic endeavor. This re-
quires a general awareness of the processes of psychotherapy
and of the dangers inherent in certain sorts of intrapersonal
dynamics and interpersonal situations. However, it does not
require the ability to predict a specific harm to a specific
victim. To the extent that psychotherapy can develop so-
cially acceptable modes of interaction, this capacity to in-
fluence the likelihood of harm can be exercised despite the
therapist's inability to predict violence because he can pro-
mote generally safe patterns of behavior. Finally, the thera-
pist can and should be aware of the general necessity and
opportunity to practice his profession in such a way as to
decrease the likelihood of violent behavior despite the inabil-
ity to predict such behavior in a specific situation.
Given the assumption that effective psychotherapy can be
useful in decreasing a patient's tendency toward dangerous
behavior, the application of [2] to psychotherapy would
yield the conclusion that the psychotherapeutic realtionship
is a Type A special relationship that engenders a responsibil-
ity to influence the potentially dangerous behavior of a third
person (the client). This influence must be exercised through
the skillful and careful practice of psychotherapy which is
the substantive special ability that underlies the special
responsibility and places the psychotherapeutic relationship
within the scope of the doctrine of special relationships.
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Admittedly, it will be very difficult to accurately define and
apply professional standards for this duty. As stated pre-
viously, virtually all theories of psychotherapy agree that
successful therapy requires both technique and relationship.
Adequate knowledge and command of therapeutic tech-
niques may be relatively amenable to specification (although
even this aspect raises significant problems). However, rela-
tionship issues are much more difficult to isolate as they
involve not only capacities and actions of the therapist, but
also the compatibility of the participants. Despite the in-
herent difficulties involved in developing professional stan-
dards for the responsible practice of psychotherapy, this
appears to be a much more viable and justifiable option
than the Tarasoff court's decision to invoke a duty to warn
involving unspecified professional standards and presuppos-
ing an admittedly nonexistent capacity.
In summary, we have argued that the doctrine of special
relationships is most accurately seen as an extension of the
more general principle of negligence. To the extent that a
profession provides some special capacity to influence the
potential harm done by a client to another, then the profes-
sional has the obligation to exercise this aspect of his
profession with skill and care just as he is obligated to
practice the other aspects of his profession. Hence it is
primarily the possession of some special capacity to in-
fluence potential harm which renders any profession an
appropriate subject of the doctrine of special relationships.
Given the existence of such a special capacity and thus the
duty to prevent harm, the professional is obligated to em-
ploy all the skills he has or a member of his profession
should have in the pursuit of this duty.
However, the duty to warn is predicated upon a special
capacity to predict dangerous behavior to some acceptable
degree of probability and the available evidence strongly
supports the contention that this capacity does not exist.
Therefore, the Tarasoff court's assertion that the doctrine of
special relationships is applicable to psychotherapy as a
foundation for a duty to warn (or any other duty based
upon a capacity to predict) was erroneous in that the special
capacity necessary to the appropriate application of this
doctrine as a foundation for this duty is absent. Therefore,
the court has provided no basis for a duty to control third
persons or to influence the harm they may cause.
We have proposed an alternative special capacity (i.e., the
ability to decrease the tendency toward dangerous behavior
through the competent practice of psychotherapy) which
may provide the foundation for inclusion of the psy-
chotherapeutic relationship within the scope of the doctrine
of special relationships. If the rather tenuous data in support
of this capacity are sufficient for inclusion under the doc-
trine of special relationships (as we believe they are), then
the duty to prevent harm through the careful and competent
practice of therapy would follow, but a duty to predict and
warn would not. If these tenuous data are not sufficient,
then we can see no basis for including psychotherapy under
the doctrine of special relationships and thus no foundation
for a duty to control third persons or influence the potential
harm they may cause.
V.
It may be prudent to anticipate several apparent objections
to this conclusion. The first relies on established judicial
practice and argues that this alleged inability to predict is
inconsistent with years of practice during which psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists have testified regarding dangerousness
for the purpose of involuntary commitment. This may well
be a telling blow but, if so, it has struck the wrong target.
We would contend that when a strong body of empirical
data contradicts a common practice, the reasonable response
is to alter the practice, not to ignore the evidence. Some
involuntary commitment laws have already recognized this
fact and have defined dangerousness for purposes of com-
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mitment in terms of a recent pattern of dangerous acts or
threats rather than as a matter to be determined by profes-
sional testimony.34
An alternative strategy might be to accept the fact that there
is no evidence of a special ability to predict but argue that
the psychotherapeutic relationship provides special access to
threats, and hence an unusual opportunity to be aware of
impending harm which can be prevented through warning.
One obvious response is that we have no evidence to support
the contention that warnings decrease rather than increase
the likelihood of violence.
However, there is a more fundamental contradiction in the
"special access" argument. If this special access exists, it is
apparently a function of the private nature of the psy-
chotherapeutic relationship in which intimate disclosures of
many kinds occur. Most clients enter psychotherapy with the
understanding that such information is confidential and
hence may be communicated without fear of publicity or
penalty. Should the therapist choose to convey such state-
ments to others in the form of a warning, he is quite likely to
foreclose his access to sensitive information and hence pre-
clude those conditions which allegedly make the relationship
special in this sense (i.e., in the sense of providing special
access to threats).35
It is widely accepted that successful psychotherapy requires a
trusting relationship which includes the belief that intimate
revelations will be held in confidence. The practice of
divulging these disclosures through warnings (if commonly
accepted) may be expected not only to impair a particular
therapeutic relationship, but also to prevent other poten-
tially dangerous clients from entering therapy or from fully
engaging in it, particularly in light of the fact that ethical
principles require that clients be informed of the limits of
confidentiality.36 Perhaps more importantly, to the extent
that it impaired the therapeutic endeavor, this practice would
prevent the therapist from protecting others through the
method he does have at his disposal and which, we have
argued, he has a duty to exercise, i.e., the skillful and
careful practice of psychotherapy.
One might reply that confidentiality in psychotherapy has
never been absolute and the duty to warn applies only in that
limited number of cases in which the danger to others is
imminent. However, it must be remembered that this special
access to threats provides no additional assistance in dif-
ferentiating those which are likely to be carried out from
those which are not and, consequently, the therapist remains
incapable of delivering the required predictive accuracy.
Hence, there is no way to identify those situations in which
the danger is imminent. Should the duty to warn be gener-
ally enforced, then in order to avoid liability, therapists
would be likely to respond as they have in studies involving
admission/discharge decisions-they would grossly overpre-
dict danger.
A proponent of the duty to warn might claim that the
foregoing arguments have not really refuted the duty to
warn at all but simply established that the professional
standards for predictive accuracy would have to be quite
low. This proponent would remind us that in the Tarasoff
case, the therapist did predict violence and the fact that
sometimes therapists do predict violence surely demonstrates
that at least in these cases they can do so. Shouldn't the
therapist therefore have a duty to warn when he does predict
violence?37
No, the therapist should not have a duty to warn when he
does predict violence because in this situation the fact that a
therapist does predict violence does not imply that he can
predict it. The source of this apparently contradictory situa-
tion lies in an equivocation regarding the term "predict" that
pervades the Tarasoff literature. Three distinct meanings of
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"predict" have been used, and frequently confused, in dis-
cussion of the duty to warn. In the weakest sense of the
word, to predict is simply to identify (overtly or covertly) an
expectation. In this sense virtually anyone can predict vir-
tually anything, and to predict in this manner suggests
absolutely nothing about accuracy or expertise. Clearly, the
ability to predict in this sense provides no foundation for a
duty to warn and no capacity to issue warnings with any
accuracy or utility. To predict in a second and stronger sense
is to foretell accurately, i.e., to identify an expectation which
turns out to be true. Unfortunately, predictions of this type
are also irrelevant to a duty to warn because they can be
differentiated from predictions in the first sense only in
retrospect. However, there is a third meaning of "predict"
which is relevant to the duty to warn. To predict in this sense
is to infer to some identifiable level of confidence on the
basis of some combination of empirical data and law-like
generalizations. Ideally, such inferences are generated from
scientific laws which are based on empirical research and
provide some quantitative statement of probability as well as
an explanation of the phenomena in question. For practical
application, predictions based on consistent correlations can
be useful even if an explanation is not presently available.
For example, a physician may be able to accurately predict
on the basis of observed correlation that his patient will be
highly contagious when that patient demonstrates symptom
pattern X, despite the fact that the physician has no idea
what causes this pattern or how it is communicated.
It is this capacity to predict in the third and strongest sense
which is relevant to the doctrine of special relationships and
the duty to warn, because it is only the capacity to predict in
this sense that provides the special ability to influence harm
through accurate prediction and warning. Throughout the
remainder of this article, "predict" will be used only in this
sense. 8 When the substance of a profession provides the
special knowledge necessary to predict some identifiable
outcome on the basis of some specifiable prior observations
to some stipulated level of confidence, then a competent and
careful practitioner of that profession can reasonably be
expected to make the relevant observations, draw the appro-
priate inferences, and take whatever action is professionally
and legally acceptable. If this particular ability to predict
constitutes a "special ability" to prevent harm, then it serves
to bring that profession within the scope of the doctrine of
special relationships and, if a warning is a viable method of
preventing harm, then a duty to warn may well be appropri-
ate.
The level of confidence necessary to give rise to a duty to
warn may vary considerably on the basis of such considera-
tions as the likely effects of warnings (both accurate and
inaccurate) and the availability of alternatives. The level of
confidence necessary to justify a duty to warn would have to
be determined by the courts and legislature in light of
societal values and the expected effects. However, it hardly
seems plausible that the minimal levels of confidence
described earlier39 could be seen as sufficient to establish a
duty to warn in Tarasoff-like situations, particularly in light
of the serious possibility that warnings may increase rather
than decrease the overall likelihood of violence. 4
The Tarasoff case may provide an unfortunate demonstra-
tion of the potential ramifications of failing to distinguish
among these three meanings of "predict." The Tarasoff
therapist apparently did identify his expectation that
violence was likely. However, it is impossible to determine
whether or not that expectation was accurate at the time he
formed it, because he took action based on his expectation
which may well have contributed to Poddar's action. His
attempt to hospitalize Poddar may have resulted in addi-
tional humiliation as well as alienation from therapy and
consequently increased the probability of violence. Admit-
tedly, this is speculative but it is precisely this indeterminate
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nature of the situation which is at issue. The Tarasoff case
aptly demonstrates that neither the fact that the therapist
expected violence nor the fact that he foretold it implies that
he was able to predict it. Furthermore, even in retrospect we
are unable to determine whether his expectation (and his
subsequent action) accurately foretold the danger or actively
enhanced it. The important point here is that the court's
decision was based partially on the presumed societal bene-
fits of warnings, but neither the facts of the case nor any
available empirical evidence provides any reason to presume
that the effects of such actions would be beneficial. Rather,
it remains a controversial empirical question x*hether warn-
ings would increase or decrease the probability of danger.
This situation stands in stark contrast to that of the physi-
cian who may be expected to accurately predict the probabil-
ity of infection because it is the disease, which his training
enables him to diagnose, which is the source of the danger.
However, when dealing with psychological dysfunction, it is
the person, not the disorder, who is dangerous and violence
has not been associated with any particular diagnosis by
scientific explanation, or even by close statistical correla-
tion.41 Therefore, for the psychotherapist (as opposed to the
physician dealing with physical disease), competency as a
diagnostician entails no capacity to predict danger.
Why, then, does it seem so abhorrent to say that the
therapist should not have a duty to warn when he does
expect violence? We would like to suggest a three-part
answer to this question. The first is to be found in the
equivocation described above which promotes the illusion
that therapists who expect violence can predict it and thus
are in a position to warn accurately. The second is the
majority's unquestioned but unsubstantiated assumption
that warnings will prevent rather than promote harm. The
conjunction of these two factors provides the illusion that
the therapist who expects violence can warn as a reliable
method of decreasing the danger. This illusion takes on
particular significance in light of the third factor, which is
that it seems morally repugnant to allow an innocent to be
harmed when we can prevent it without risk to ourselves,
regardless of whether we are engaged in a professional
relationship with them. However, this repugnance is more
accurately seen as atttached to the legal rule that there is no
duty to prevent harm by others,' 2 and it cannot be ade-
quately addressed through distortions or misapplications of
the doctrine of special relationships.
Suppose that psychotherapists developed the capacity to
predict violence to some acceptable level of confidence.
Should there then be a duty to warn? The doctrine of special
relationships would provide a foundation for the duty to
warn but if the court based its decion partially on policy
considerations (as the Tarasoff court did) the likely conclu-
sion is far from obvious. The calculation of the balance of
policy considerations would require assumptions regarding
several empirical issues about which our knowledge is in-
complete. Among these unanswered questions are the fol-
lowing: (1) Would warnings increase or decrease the
probability of violence (in this particular case and in
general)? (2) What would be the effect on the participation
in and benefit from psychotherapy? (3) What is the potential
of psychotherapy to deter violence? (4) How do psy-
chotherapy and warnings compare as means of preventing
violence? Depending on the available data regarding such
questions, it is conceivable that psychotherapists might be
exempt from a duty to warn even if such a duty existed for
the population in general. Our claim here is not that psy-
chotherapists should not have a duty to warn if the ability to
predict is developed, but only that it is not obvious that they
should.
Finally, one could argue that the attempt to define psy-
chotherapy as a Type A special relationship was misguided;
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it is really a Type B special relationship based on a profes-
sional's general obligation to the community he serves.43
However, the professional can only fulfill his general obliga-
tion to society (as he can fulfill the specific one to his client)
by exerting due care in the exercise of those skills that his
profession provides, and it has been established that the
ability to predict is not among these.
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